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II’~CEEARLY this yeas the Fedcial Reserve hOts
emphasized member bank reserves available for pri-
vate nonbank deposits (RPDs) as its short-run operat-
ing target.1 RPDs are a reserve aggregate, defined as
total member bank reserves less reserves required
against U.S. Government demand deposits and net
interbank deposits. This article examines a framework
in which a reserve aggregate, such as RPDs, functions
as an operating target to achieve policy objectives.
U.S. monetary authorities — the Federal Reserve
System and the U.S. Treasury — share in the responsi-
bility for achieving the Government’s economic stabi-
lization objectives. These objectives, such as reducing
inflation and unemployment, and encouraging a sus-
tainable growth of output and income, are sometimes
summarized in a growth rate for gross national prod-
uct (GNP). From the point of view of the monetary
authorities, influencing GNP is generally interpreted
as being achieved through the intermediate step of
influencing market interest rates or growth of the
money stock. In this article we assume that policy
objectives have been translated into a desired growth
rate for the money stock and examine how the use of
a reserve aggregate as an operating target can help
the Federal Reserve achieve the desiredrate of growth
of the money stock.
Definition of the Money Stock
The money stock can be measured in scveral differ-
ent ways. Most commonly, it is measured as M1 (dc-
mand deposits plus currency in the hands of the
public). Other measures include 2 (M1 plus time
~“Record of Policy Actions” of the Federal Open Market
Committee, Federal Reserve Bulletin (May 1972), p. 459.
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dcposits at commercial banks other than large certifi-
citcs of dcposit) and M( M 4 plus deposits at non-
bank thnft institutions) -
In this aiticle the M1 me~suie — dcmind dcposits
~snd cusiency in the hands of the public — is used,
wherc public is any person or mstitution other than
a monctary authority or a commercial bank This
definition of public means that currency held by com-
mercial banks the U S Treasury, or Federal Reserve
Banks and demand deposits owned by the U S Treas-
ury (Government deposits) or commercial banks (in
terb’ink deposits) are cxcluded from the money stock
The demand deposit component of the money stock
is sometimes called “private demand deposits.” When
this terminology is used, “private” deposits must be in-
terpreted as including those owned by state and local
governments. The term “demand deposits adjusted”
is also used to refer to the demand deposit component
of money, computed as demand deposits at all com-
mercial banks other than those due to domestic com-
mercial banks and the U.S. Government, less cash
items in process of collection and Federal Reserve
float, plus foreign demand balances at Federal Reserve
Banks.
Sources of the Money Stock
The publics most immediate sources of money are
commercial banks. The ultimate sources of money in
our economy, however, are the monetary authorities
— the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve System.
2
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Commercial banks are very important in the money
supply process because thc public chooses to hold
money in the form of demand deposits. When cur-
rcncy supplied by the monetary authorities is ex-
changed by the public for a demand deposit, the form
of money changes. In addition, banks obtain addi-
tional reserves. In a fractional reserve banking sys-
temn, which is what we have in the United States,
required reserves equal only a fraction of deposits.
The remainder of funds obtained with deposits may
be used by banks to make loans or investments. By
making loans commercial banks increase their liabili-
ties (demand deposits) and assets (loans ) , and in a
sense “create” money on the basis of the original
money (reserves) provided by the monetary authori-
ties. The net monetary liabilities of the monetary
authorities are held either as currency in the hands of
the public or as commercial hank reserves and can he
viewed as the “base” for the nation’s money stock.
The capacity of the commercial banking system to
create demand deposits is constrained by the total
amount of reserves it has and by the ratio of required
reserves to deposits. The Federal Reserve System can
directly influence the money stock by both influenc-
ing the amount of reserves and changing reserve
requirements.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System establishes the proportions of various types of
deposits that member banks must hold either as vault
cash or as deposits at Federal Reserve Banks to meet
legal reserve requirements. Presently, required reserve
ratios are between 12.5 and 17.5 percent on demand
deposits and 3 or 5 percent on time deposits,3 The
higher the required reserve ratio, the smaller the
amount of demand deposits the banking system can
create with any given amount of reserves.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMG),
through decisions on Federal Reserve open market
operations, has an important influence on the amount
of reserves in the banking system. This Committee,
composed of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents,
tm
lleserve requirements of member banks are listed in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin. For example, see p. A 10 of the
July 1972 issue.
Since reserve requirements for commercial banks cunently
differ with respect to their classification and amounts of de-
posits, shifts in deposits from reserve city banks to country
banks or vice versa, from member banks to nonasember banks
or vice versa, or from smaller to larger banks or vice versa,
may change the ratio of required reserves to deposits for the
banking system as a whole.
meets about once a month to consider economic con-
ditions and the ways in which its actions can best
serve economic goals. The decisions of the FOMC
are carried out at the ‘trading Desk of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, The Manager of the
Trading Desk buys~~a~id sells securities on behalf of
the twelve Federal Reserve Banks in accordance with
the instructions of the “Directive” from the FOMC.
When the Trading Desk buys a security, it pays for
it by supplying either bank reserves or currency. On
the other hand, when it sells a security, payment to
the Federal Reserve results in a reduction of bank re-
serves or currency in the hands of the public.
Reserve Aggregates as Operating Targets
We have seen that bank reserves influence the
money stock and that the total amount of reserves in
the banking system is strongly affected by Federal
Reserve open market operations. Next we want to
identify the factors that determine the relationships
between changes in various measures of hank reserves,
that is, various reserve aggregates, and changes in the
money stock, For a reserve aggregate to function as
an operating target, policymakers must be able to
predict the relationship between the reserve aggregate
and money with some degree of accuracy over the
period in which they are attempting to control the
reserve aggregate. Information about this relationship
is necessary in order to select the appropriate path for
the reserve aggregate. We must also examine the in-
formation which is necessary to achieve desired
changes in the reserve aggregate, since paths of the
reserve aggregates themselves are not under the com-
plete control of the monetary authorities.
There are many reserve aggregates which bear
definable relationships to the money stock on one side
and to open market operations on the other. We will
consider three: the monetary base, member hank re-
serves, and RPDs (member hank reserves used to
support private nonbank deposits).
One reserve aggregate concept that is useful for
monetary analysis is the monetary base. The base is
defined as the net monetary liabilities of the Govern-
ment (U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem) held by commercial banks and the nonbauk
public. These monetary liabilities are member hank
reserves and currency in the hands of the puhlic.~
use of the base which is excluded from the analysis in this
paper is vault cash held by nonmember banks.
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The monetary base is derived from a consolidated
balance sheet of the Treasumy and Federal Reserve
“monetary” accounts. The total amount of base out-
standing at any time is principally determined by the
U.S. gold stock (which has been relatively constant
in recent years) and the amount of U.S. Government
securities owned by the Federal Reserve System.
Whenever the Federal Reserve buys securities on the
open market for its own account, the monetary base
increases.°
The amount of money the base will support is
largely determined by the decisions of commercial
banks, the public, and the Treasury. Each $1 of base
the public chooses to hold as currency, for example,
supports only $1 of money; whereas $1 of base held in
the banking system as reserves may support more than
$1 of demand deposits and therefore more than $1 of
money. However, if reserves are absorbed as require-
ments against Government deposits, interbank de-
posits, or time deposits, then they are not available to
support expansion of private demand deposits. The
amount of demand deposit money that the banking
system can supply to the public with a given amount
of reserves is influenced by decisions determining the
relative amounts of different types of bank deposits.
A more detailed example can help explain how the
behavior of commercial banks, the public, and the
Treasury influences the amount of money that the
base will support (see illustration). Suppose the base
equals $100 billion, $60 billion of which is used as
currency in the hands of the public and $40 billion as
hank reserves. These reserves may be used as legal
reserve requirements against time deposits, private
demand deposits, U.S. Government deposits, inter-
bank deposits,°or they could be held by banks as ex-
cess reserves. We can assume a certain set of reserve
requirement ratios for the different types of deposits
and a certain amount of each type of deposit, and
compute the money stock \vhieh is consistent with the
$100 billion base. Assume banks must hold reserves
equal to 5 percent of time deposits and 15 percent of
5
For a more detailed discussion of the monetary base, see
Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “The Monetary
Base — Explanation and Analytical Use,” this Review (August
1968), pp. 7-11; Jerry L. Jordan, “Elements of Money Stock
Determinalion,” this Review (October 1969), pp. 10-19; Jane
Anderson and Thomas M. Humphrey, “Determinants of
Change in the Money Stock: 1960-1970, Monthly Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (March 1972), pp. 2-8;
John D. flea, “Sources of Money Growth in 1970 and 1971,
Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (July
/August 1972), pp. 3-13.
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all other deposits If the public chooses to hold $300
billion of tmmc dcposits this uses up or ibsoibs 05 x
$300 billion or $15 billion of reserves. Now $25 billion
of reserves are available to support various types of
demand deposits. If Government deposits equal $4
billion and intcrbauk deposits equal $1 billion, these
two types of deposits use up 0.15 x $5 billion or $0.75
billion of reserves. The remaining $24.25 billion of re-
serves will support a maximum of approximately $162
billion of private demand deposits.7 If banks choose to
hold $1 billion in excess rcserves then givcn our other
assumptions, reserves used to support private demand
deposits will equal $23.25 billion and private demand
deposits will amount to ‘$155 billion. In this example,
the base of $100 billion supports a money stock of
$215 billion, $60 billion of which is currency and $155
billion of which is pnvatc dcmand deposits
A change in the composition of deposits could be
expected to change the amount of money resulting
from a $100 billion base. Suppose the public decided
to increase its holdings of lime deposits by $50 billion,
Initially this would require a $50 billion reduction in
private demand deposits, assuming other factors do
not change Since the ritio of required reserves to tune
deposits is less than the ratio of required reserves to
demand deposits, the shift would lower the average
reserve requirement for the banking system. By mak-
ing loans with reserves released in the shift of deposits,
the banking system could again raise the level of de-
mand deposits in the system. In the example, a $50
billion contraction of demand deposits would release
87,5 billion of reserves (0.15 x $50 billion). The in-
crease in time deposits uvould absorb $2.5 billion of
reserves (.05 x $50 billion). The remaining $5 billion
of reserves uvould support $33.33 billion of demand
$5 billion .
deposits ~ One might look at it in the fol-
lowing way. A $50 billion increase in time deposits
\vould require a $16.67 billion contraction of demand
deposits, given other things do not change. Increased
preference for time deposits, with no change in the
amount of base, results in a decline in private de-
mand deposits, and hence money stock.
An increase in Government deposits at the expense
of private demand deposits, with no change in total
hank reserves, would also result in a contraction of
the money stock, One occasion in which this occurs is
when people pay Federal income taxes. With more
reserves used to support Government deposits and
~This is computed by dividing reserves available by the re-
$24.25 billion . quired reserve ratio ----a = $161.6i billionFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST 1972
A reserve aggregate can serve us an effective opernttng target when monetary authorities can select the appropriate growth rote of the reserve aggregate and
achieve that growth rut, with an acceptable degree of accuracy. Selecting a desired growth path for a reserve aggregate involves predicting its relationship to the
money stack. Achieving the selected growth role requires predicting the relationship hetween monetary actions and the reserve aggregate.
The boxes across the top of the illustration show the ‘‘uses’ of reserve aggregates. Each af these ‘‘uses” influences either the relationship hetween a reserve
aggregate and maney, or the relationship between open market operations and the path of the reserve aggregate. Assuming the monetary base can be controlled by
the monetary authorities, its use as an aperatiag target ond the selection of its magnitude requires predicting its relationship to money, which is affected by I-Vt.
If total member honk reserves are used as the operating target, the selectman of their path requires thot the money relationship involving Il-VI be estimated.
Achieving the target itself implies knowledge of the monetary base and I. The use of RPDs (reserves available to support private nonbank deposits) as the operating
target requires predicting a relationship involving 11,111, and IV to select the growth of RPDs and information about IV, and VI to achieve that poth.
‘The illustration excludes consideration of nondeposit sources of funds and vault cast, of nonnsember banks. Reserve requirements are assumed to be 15 percent
on private demand, Government demand, and interbank deposits, and 5 percent on time deposits.
base and growth of the money stock could be known
precisely, and the FOMC could translate any desired
growth rate of the money stock into a target rate of
growth for the base. Since most of the uses cannot be
predicted with complete certainty, the relationship
between the base and money is often estimated from
historical behavior as a single number, or “multiplier.”
This multiplier nevertheless incorporates conceptually
and quantitatively all of the uses of the base discussed
in preceding paragraphs.
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fewer available to support private deposits, the money
stock tends to decline.
If the Federal Reserve were to use the base as its
operating target to achieve the desired rate of growth
of the inonc’y stock, it would have to predict with
some degree of accuracy the relationship between the
growth rate of the base and the growth rate of the
money stock. If all the uses of the base were known
with certainty, the relationship between growth of the
Illustrations of Uses of Reserve Aggregates*
(Billions of Dollars)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST 1972
A second criterion for using the base as an operat-
ing target is that the Trading Desk must be able to
achieve the targeted rate of growth of the base. To do
this, it must predict what will be happening to factors,
other than those under its initiative, which affect the
base. These factors include changes in Federal Re-
serve float and member bank borrowing from Federal
Reserve Banks. W~ithinformation about how outside
factors would result in increases or decreases in the
base, the Desk could use open market operations to
make up the difference between the change in the
base caused by uncontrolled factors and the desired
change. For example, suppose that the base were the
operating target, that the only two sources of the base
were Federal Reserve purchases of securities and
Federal Reserve lending to member banks, and that
these two sources were independent of each other. If
the desired rate of growth of the base were translated
into a $1 billion increase in a given week, and the
Trading Desk expected a $0.3 billion increase inmem-
ber bank borrowing that weelç it would purchase $0.7
billion of securities to make up the difference.
— N
Bank reserves can be viewed as the base less the
currency component of the money stock. If reserves
were used as an operating target, then the relation-
ship to be estimated would be between reserves and
the demand deposit component of money. Information
about currency, necessary to achieve a certain growth
rate of reserves, could be used to compute the change
in private demand deposits necessary to achieve the
desired money growth.
The Trading Desk must predict the public’s de-
mand for currency in order to attain the desired
growth rate for reserves, since changes in the public’s
holdings of currency change the amount of the base
available for bank reserves. In other words, the Desk
must predict the distribution of uses of the base be-
tween currency in the hands of the public and bank
reserves, as well as uncontrolled influences on the
base. If the FOMG has very good evidence about
what will be happening to currency in the hands of
the public because, say, currency has increased at a
historically steady rate, then it may be no more diffi-
cult to achieve a given growth rate for reserves than
for the base. If at the same time the relationship be-
tween reserves and demand deposits is more pre-
dictable than that between the base and money, using
reserves instead of the base as the operating target
might result in a lower error involved in achieving the
desired rate of money growth.
RPDs are a particular reserve aggregate that can
be viewed as the base minus currency in the hands
of the public and reserves used to meet legal require-
ments against U.S. Government demand deposits and
net interbank deposits. This is equivalent to total
member bank reserves minus required reserves against
Government and interhank deposits. In the illustra-
tion RPDs amount to $39.25 billion.
As is the case with any other reserve aggregate,
how changes in RPDs affect the money stock is influ-
enced by its uses. Uses of RPD5 include required re-
serves against all time and savings deposits, required
reserves against private demand deposits, and excess
reserves. Since RPDs exclude required reserves
against Government and interbank deposits, informa-
tion about these two types of deposits is not needed to
estimate the relationship between RPDs and private
demand deposits. However, in order for the Trading
Desk to achieve the targeted path of RPDs, it must
estimate reserves required against Government and
interbank deposits. This is in addition to forecasting
factors needed to achieve total reserves.
Since fewer factors affect the relationship between
RPDs and demand deposits than those involving the
base or total reserves, the relationship between RPDs
and the money stock may exhibit greater stability
than either of the others. If this is so, errors involved
in selecting the correct path of RPDs might be smaller
than those involved in selecting an appropriate path
for the monetary base or total reserves, If at the same
time, currency, Government deposit, and interbank
deposit uses of the base can be estimated with con-
siderable accuracy, errors involved in achieving the
targeted growth rate for RPDs would not be signifi-
cantly larger than those involved in achieving given
growth rates for the base or total reserves. In general,
reliable information about some of the uses of a re-
serve aggregate may tend to make the aggregate
which excludes those uses a better operating target.
Interpreting Changes in Reserve Aggregates
As is implied in the foregoing discussion, changes
in the growth rate of a reserve aggregate, such as
RPDs, should not be viewed as indications of the
tightness or ease of monetary actions. For example,
any increase in a reserve aggregate which is absorbed
as required reserves against time deposits is not avail-
able to support expansion in private demand deposits.
Consequently, when the public is accelerating the
pace of acquiring time deposits, larger growth rates
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in the reserve aggregates discussed will be necessary
to achieve a given growth rate of money, compared to
when time deposit growth is constant or decelerating.
In other words, the same rate of growth of a reserve
aggregate may result in different rates of growth of
money at different times.
In terms of RPDs, one might find that a 6 percent
annual rate of growth in money could require a 6 per-
cent rate of growth of RPDs in one month and an S
percent rate in another. This suggests that one
should employ some caution in interpreting changes
in the growth rate of RPDs over short periods. A
change in the rate of growth of RPDs does not neces-
sarily suggest a change in the influence of monetary
actions on economic activity.
It is sometimes assumed, as it is here, that the rate
of growth of the money stock over a period of signif-
icant duration indicates the impact of monetary de-
velopments on the economy. Interpreting the role of
reserve aggregates in such a framework requires in-
formation about changes in other factors that influence
money growth.
Summary
A reserve aggregate is an effective operating target
for monetary policy when the Federal Reserve can
both select the growth rate of the aggregate required
to meet policy goals and achieve that growth rate
with some degree of accuracy. If the growth of the
money stock is an important intermediate link be-
tween monetary actions and the ultimate goal of
monetary policy, then the first criterion suggests that
the Federal Reserve must be able to forecast the
average relation between the reserve aggregate and
the money stock over the period in which it attempts
to control the reserve aggregate. The second criterion
suggests that the Trading Desk must be able to fore-
cast changes in the reserve aggregate that would re-
sult from circumstances other than its own actions.
Errors are bound to exist in both the estimation of
the relationship between the growth rates of the re-
serve aggregate and money and in the forecast of
uncontrollable factors influencing the growth of the
reserve aggregate. If the errors are small, however,
they may be of little consequence to the growth rate
of the money stock over the period in which it is
significant to GNP.
Thus the choice of a specific reserve aggregate as
an operating target depends on whether:
(1) the information necessary to select the appro-
priate growth path of that reserve aggregate is
better than the infonnation necessary to select
growth paths of other aggregates;
(2) the information necessary to achieve a selected
growth path of that reserve aggregate is better
than the information necessary to achieve growth
paths of other aggregates; and
(3) the total information errors (in selecting and
achieving) are minimized by using that reserve
aggregate as compared to other aggregates.
The FOMC adopted RPDs as its operating target
at its February 1972 meeting. RPDs are a reserve ag-
gregate defined as total member bank reserves less
reserves required against U.S. Government demand
and net interhank deposits.
Since the experiment using RPDs as the operating
target has been in existence for only about seven
months, there is insufficient evidence to judge the
extent to which it is a better target than reserves or
the base. The experience thus far indicates, however,
that the use of RPDs has been quite successful in
producing desired money growth.
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